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ABSTRACT 
For newly formed democracies, security-sector reform is essential and plays a 
crucial role in their long-term governmental and institutional stability. The 
implementation of appropriate security-sector reform by transitional governments in 
areas of regional instability, such as Iraq, Argentina, and El Salvador, is an issue of 
considerable concern, not only for the countries themselves, but also for their neighbors 
and the world at large.  Such civil-military reforms provide newly elected civilian 
governments stability, peace of mind, and a monopoly on the use of armed force to 
ensure the safety of national borders, sovereignty, and public safety. The purpose of this 
thesis is to define and explore the successes and failures of the Argentine reforms under 
the new democratically elected civilian government vis-à-vis security services’ overall 
performance.  It will examine the overall effectiveness of the security services under 
these reforms by breaking down the successes and failures across the police, military, and 
Gendarmerie forces.  This thesis focuses on Argentina’s reform of its three major security 
services following the collapse of the military junta there in 1983. And will analyze the 
successes and failures of Argentina’s reforms by examining the overall performance of 
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For many newly formed democracies, security-sector reform is essential and plays 
a crucial role in their long-term governmental and institutional stability. Today, the 
implementation of appropriate security-sector reform by transitional governments in 
areas of regional instability, such as Iraq, Argentina, and El Salvador, is an issue of 
considerable concern, not only for the countries themselves, but also for their neighbors 
and the world at large. 
Such civil-military reforms provide newly elected civilian governments stability, 
peace of mind, and a monopoly on the use of armed force to ensure the safety of national 
borders, national sovereignty, and public safety. However, the proper checks and 
balances must also be established to ensure government transparency and honesty.   
The purpose of this thesis will be to define and explore the success and failures of the 
Argentine reforms under the new democratically-elected civilian government vis-à-vis 
security services’ overall performance.  Then it will examine the overall effectiveness of 
these security services’ under these new reforms by breaking down the success’ and 
failures across the police, military, and Gendarmerie forces. 
A. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will focus on Argentina’s reform of its three major security services 
following the end of military government in 1983. The thesis will analyze the successes 
and failures of Argentina’s reforms by examining the overall performance of the security 
services and their effectiveness under the new reforms.  
During the past thirty years, Argentina, one of the most developed and well-
established nations in Latin America, has experienced political and economic crises that 
greatly affected the nation’s efforts to reform its security apparatus. As a result, 
Argentina is routinely cited as a significant example of security reform. Therefore, it 
provides a useful barometer for exploring and measuring similar issues and problems in 




B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
Has the new democratic government of Argentina produced an effective security 
service force through the implementation of reforms and/or the lack of reforms?  Are the 
institutions (i.e. security services) under legitimate governmental control?  Have reforms 
added or detracted to the effectiveness of the security services? 
To examine the Argentine question of security service reform, the sector must be 
broken down into each of the three major divisions: police, military and Gendarmerie.  
As we explore each service, we must examine their relationship with key causal factors, 
both the opportunity created by crisis and the degree of insulation from reform provided 
by politicians, which have dictated the success or failure of the reforms.  Crisis has been 
stated as a motivating factor for implementing reform throughout Latin America.  In 
Argentina, crises included a number of national stresses stemming from economic 
collapse, failed military regimes, failed military campaigns, and non-judicial killings that 
ultimately exerted enough public pressure to drive the government to implement reforms.  
In Argentina, political insulation is the relationship of the political government vis-à-vis 
each security service.  Political insulation will vary with the perceived threat or advantage 
of each service in relation to the political class, and therefore, translate into the viability 
of reform implementation success or failure.  In Argentina, the interaction of crisis and 
political insulation for each individual security service in relation of reform is illustrated 
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C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will review and examine academic and policy experts’ discussions of 
the need for and the methods used to implement effective security-sector reform. It will 
focus on three distinct security units in Argentina: the police, the military, and a hybrid 
military-police entity known in Europe and Latin America as the Gendarmerie. This 
review will start with the police reform, which has become the most salient issue in 
Argentina.  Next, it will consider the military, a relative success, and finally the 
Gendarmerie, in the multiple hybrid roles formally held by the military. The research 
draws on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are limited to 
translated articles and texts.  
D. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The thesis consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter includes the thesis 
objectives and importance, a brief summary of the thesis methodology, and a chapter-by-
chapter summary.  
Chapter II presents an overview of the pertinent literature and current theories 
pertaining to security-sector reform. It shows the issues that academic and diplomatic 
experts consider significant and describes what an authentic process of security-sector 
reform in a transitional democratic government would look like. The chapter is divided 
into three sections, one on each of the armed security forces: the police, the military, and 
the Gendarmerie.  
Chapter III presents the historical background in Argentina, along with 
describing, in detail, Argentina’s continuing need for security-sector reform. It begins 
with the military campaign in the Falklands in 1982, and continues through the riots 
caused by the recent economic crisis.  
Chapter IV discusses the proposed reform of Argentina’s three security forces – 
the police, the military, and the Gendarmerie.  
Chapter V, which is divided into two sections, discusses examples of successful 
reform policies, as well as examples of reform failures. Each chapter is also divided into 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this chapter, we discuss and examine the relevant academic and policy 
literature in regard to effective security service reform.  Within the police reform 
literature we will find that the impetus for reform depends upon the availability of key 
resources among politicians, including whether there exists the necessary funding and/or 
political will.  The military reform literature finds that creditable and capable civilian 
governmental management institutions are the bedrock of effective and long lasting 
reform.  The literature on the reform of Gendarmeries, while still in its infancy, 
incorporates aspects of both the police and military literature and emphasizes the need for 
greater research and documentation. Within the literature we see varying findings for 
each particular security service.  Literature dealing with police reforms focuses on 
changes in training, greater inclusion of minorities and the socially disenfranchised as a 
way to reach out to local communities, and of the role of purges of dysfunctional police 
forces in reform processes, all of which are dependent on the availability of domestic and 
international funding.  Whereas military reform literature delves into civil military 
relations, civilian control of the military structure through an effective civilian chain of 
command, and institution building within the political and military bureaucracy alike.  
Finally, when examining the Gendarmerie we have only found limited literature 
discussing its institutional reform.  However, the information available seems to follow a 
mixture of the police and military models mentioned above, emphasizing civilian control 
and the chain of command.     
A.  POLICE REFORM 
 In his book, Challenges in Police Reform, Charles Call points out that, for 
countries in transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, one of the most 
important issues in post-conflict police reform is identifying the “relevant actors and 
counterparts.”1 And, as Hugo Frühling and David Bailey argue, police services in 
authoritarian and subsequent post-authoritarian governments are, characteristically, 
militaristic. Often, they have a well-developed, though unofficial, link to the military and, 
                                                 
1 Charles T. Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, New 
York, N.Y.: International Peace Academy, 2003, 2. 
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in many instances, had “assumed a role that was subordinate to the military.”2 This 
means that, generally, the public only resorts to police assistance when there is no other 
alternative, and that the police are seen primarily as an agent for governmental needs 
rather than the needs of the people.3  
Many writers show that in Latin American, the police typically use force more 
frequently and disproportionably than their counterparts in more highly developed states, 
and that any monitoring of police activities, whether internal or external, is either 
extremely low or nonexistent. As a result, public support for the police is extremely low 
and public perceptions of them extremely negative. In their organizational structure, force 
application, intelligence gathering, and subordination to government, police systems have 
been based primarily on a military model. However, as John Bailey and Lucia Dammert 
point out, in democratic governments the police are a critical part of a country’s political 
system. They are significant actors in the progress of democratic governance and a vital 
aspect in maintaining a basic level of public security.   
Police reform becomes a pressing issue for politicians when domestic perceptions 
of crime and insecurity skyrocket.4 In that regard, Bailey and Dammert suggest that 
implementation of proper police reform will improve operational efficiency and 
effectiveness in preventing and repressing crime as well as improve “police forces’ [by] 
strengthening their democratic ethos and accountability.”5 International financial 
institutions have been key proponents of reform. Initially, many financial institutions 
(international and domestic) showed little interest in police reform initiatives. However, 
further investigation led to a reevaluation of perspectives, and the financial institutions 
then concluded that there is an overarching positive, which may have preventive effects 
                                                 
2 Hugo Frühling, “Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile,” Chapter 2, Crime and 
Policing in Transitional Societies (Johannesburg, South Africa: Jan Smuts House, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 2000), 151. 
3 For more on the history of the political influence over the police in Argentina, see Laura 
Kalmanowiecki, “Origins and Applications of Political Policing in Argentina,” Latin American 
Perspectives 27, no. 2 (March 2000): 36–56. 
4 Argentina seems to be the exception. An increased perception of insecurity and crime, in conjunction 
with a popular distrust of the police, has led to either a rise in private security institutions or impunity. 
Argentine police reform is more reflective of citizen reactions to police actions, such as extra-judicial 
killings. 
5 John Bailey and Lucia Dammert, eds., “Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas” 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 2. 
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in other sectors, in an investment in reform projects. This can be seen in the case of “the 
Inter-American Development Bank,” which cites “the social and health costs of violence 
as reasons for expanding its police development projects.”6   
Under authoritarian regimes, human rights violations are frequent occurrences. As 
a result, reforms that increase respect for human rights often figure prominently on 
transitional agendas. These are defined as a universal understanding, perceived as: 
freedom from torture, threats of death, a disproportional use of force, or police 
mistreatment.  
1. Recommended Reforms 
In regard to human rights, organizations must have in place some sort of oversight 
authority, such as an ombudsman or other human rights overseer. Decentralization of the 
police from the military and/or defense minister control is also essential in the eyes of 
human-rights organizations. Some nations transfer their police control to a civilian 
interior ministry, a move that fosters greater oversight and transparency. Currently, there 
is an increasing need for interaction between government and civil society in the 
monitoring and regulation of the public-security sector, “such as [by] citizen membership 
on police-oversight panels, neighborhood watches, or patrol organizations.”7 Revamping 
the police ranks and maintaining an emphasis on human-rights standards so as to purge 
the security services are also recommended reform steps. In addition, police doctrine and 
training must be redesigned to facilitate compliance within international human-rights 
standards. All of these measures require internal and external management to also 
institute accountability and monitoring systems. 
a. Police Doctrine Reform 
One measure thought to potentially reduce police human-rights abuses is 
an appropriate transition or redevelopment of police doctrine. This is generally termed 
“professionalization” and has become a key aspect of most police reformation. Authors 
generally explain this aspect of professionalism as simply allowing the police “to enforce 
the law” in the most effective manner possible. As such, it is an integral part of  
 
                                                 
6 Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, 3. 
7 Bailey, 13. 
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democratic governmental transitions and the preservation of human rights. In 
implementing professionalism as a part of police doctrine reform,   accountability is a 
necessary next step.   
Accountability goes beyond basic judicial measures, however, to greater 
monitoring and management linkages.8 There must be officials or ministers within the 
government who are directly responsible for the public order and safety, with 
independent judges and legal counsel charged with enforcing and prosecuting police 
misconduct.9 External civilian review boards can provide an added layer of transparency 
and supervision in the monitoring of police conduct, discipline, budget, and promotions. 
This is the system used in Canada and the United States.10 In general, it also may 
increase the proficiency level of the police in accomplishing the basic requirements of 
their mandated job. Police officers, as, in essence, the licensed agents of a local and/or 
the federal government, can and may employ force to maintain the public safety for the 
citizenry. This ability and capability to control local and transnational crime is thus 
directly related to the government’s crime-control policies and the police force’s own 
professionalization. 
b. Police Training Reform 
Many newly-elected democratic governments find that there is an 
immediate need for new training standards and techniques that can elevate the current 
quality of deployed police officers deployed. Potential recruits must often be educated or 
re-educated and evaluated for their emotional stability in respect to safeguarding newly 
adopted democratic ideals and a firm belief in the preservation of international human-
rights standards. In this regard, personnel with some educational background or the 
willingness and ability to learn can be very instrumental in fostering the proposed 
reforms. New training styles have the possibility of containing innovative techniques and 
strategies. As Frühling points out, “instruction should combine technical elements with 
actual applications to specific cases and practical exercises,” with “special attention . . . to 
                                                 




basic analysis of dangerous situations in which police must exercise good judgment,”11 
such as: situations requiring the use of firearms, the arrest or detention of people, or 
knowledge of appropriate tactics of self-defense. These situations all require sufficient 
knowledge about an appropriate and proportional response while preserving citizens’ 
human rights.12 
Democracies are known for their focus on the rule of law, on long-term 
justice, and on security measures that derive from long-term reform and post-
authoritarian transitions. Reforming and strengthening a police force is a multi-linkage 
concept. Its components include fostering and strengthening the government’s ability to 
monopolize the “rule of law,” the formalization of a justice system, and the 
implementation of greater transparency and accountability within the government 
institutions and bureaucracy. Call argues that, in the past, governments that failed to 
address a need for security-sector reform on a holistic scale lacked, as a result, the 
necessary force-enabling, or “capacity-building,” ministries.13 Ministries consisting of 
the “legislative actors and overseers, . . . human rights ombudspersons, and other 
government oversight bodies, . . . where necessary leadership resides.”14 
2. Police Planning and Research 
The management organization and structure of police forces in developed nations 
in the latter part of the twentieth century has made a dynamic leap as compared to its 
management in the early twentieth century. Most experts in this area agree that Latin 
America would be wise to consider emulation of the developed nations’ police forces and 
management styles to better facilitate their goal of implementing an effective and 
complete reform policy in the security sector.  
Ranging from the individual officer to the commissioner and the planning staff, in 
the more developed countries, flexibility and preventive measures are now key aspects of 
police techniques. One example of this is the efforts and measures implemented by 
                                                 
11 Frühling, “Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile,” 155. 
12 For more on police violence and disproportional use of force in Argentina, see Daniel M. Brinks, 
“Informal Institutions and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Response to the State Killings in Buenos Aires and 
Sao Paulo in the 1990s. 
13 Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, 4. 
14 Ibid. 
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former New York police commissioner William Bratton.15 According to Frühling, 
Bratton believed that “planning must be a multilevel process, not solely a central one, and 
must include all police stations.”16 Crime- fighting science and research provides officers 
with the knowledge to provide public safety with greater efficiency. It “also fosters a 
more creative and challenging work environment for police officers.”17 
3. Police Recruitment and Promotion 
The recruitment of officers and their management are areas under continual 
review. The major question of quality versus quantity plagues reforming nations: whether 
to quickly deploy a large quantity of police or to gradually deploy a higher quality police 
force. Typically, Latin American police forces are under considerable resource 
constraints and, therefore, receive minimal classroom and field-exercises training before 
deployment. As Call points out, “excessive accommodation of short-term interest may 
harm police development.” So whose short-term interests are being accommodated 
here?18 Quickly trained personnel that lack quality training have a disastrous potential 
due to the probable lack of adequate oversight, corruption, an adequate police-candidate 
screening process, and the increased possibility of human rights abuses. 
a. Promotion Schemes: Individual Merit-based 
Another current debate concerns promotion schemes, such as those based 
either on individual merit or on group-based selection criteria. Western models of 
security sector forces emphasize using merit-based criteria “as the best yardstick for 
entrance into a police academy, law school, or other state organization. . . .  Merit-based 
testing for admission to a police academy or for promotion helps preserve a sense of 
professionalism and downplays the salience of group identity of membership in building 
esprit de corps within the police force.”19  
 
                                                 
15 For more on William Bratton’s criminal research/police reform in New York, see Hugo Frühling, 
“Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile,” and “Police Reform and the Process of 
Democratization,” 155–156. 
16 Frühling, “Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile,” 156. 
17 Ibid., 155. 
18 Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, 5. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
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b. Promotion Schemes: Group-based 
However, to assure appropriate minority and female inclusion in the 
security service sector,    promotion schemes using group-based criteria must also be 
examined. Inclusion can help to prevent or safeguard against the repeat of past 
harassment and abuse occurrences and create transparency. And such reform will 
ultimately create in turn a foundation of local and statewide trust in the service. Cultural, 
ethnic, and sex diversification are preferable so as to facilitate the inclusion and 
representation of all members of the general populace. Implementation may, however, be 
contingent on available state resources, the educational availability per capita, population 
demographics and density, and available candidates who meet the minimum 
requirements. Most of the policy literature on security sector reform concerns the reform 
of military and police institutions in a post-conflict setting. References to the police force 
view it more as a preventative measure for possible future internal conflicts by 
“integrating formerly excluded groups into policing structures.”20 
4. Police Reform by Purging 
For governments in a post-authoritarian transition phase, purges of their security-
sector personnel may be necessary, especially if human rights violations have occurred, 
as was the case during most of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Purges may be 
a necessity before a government can implement effective reform and reconstitute the 
conduct and public image of its security services. Documentation and prosecution of 
human-rights abuse suspects is difficult, however, and can entangle both a country’s 
justice system and its society as a whole. Massive purges also greatly decrease the 
security services manning, and thus directly affect the physical security of the nation. In 
addition, they decrease both the national employment rate and the all-important tax base. 
Moreover, in the process, specific skill sets – such as comprehensive knowledge of how 
to investigate crimes and how to attract informants, which take years to develop – are 
often lost, and may create a dangerous backlash. 
a. Types of Purge Reform 
In general, there are two basic types of purge reform: top-down purging 
and bottom-up purging. Governments that want to replace their former security-sector                                                  
20 Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, 2. 
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doctrines and fortify their security forces with untainted officers often use the bottom-up 
approach. But replacing the troops without replacing their superiors often results in good 
personnel who are then subject to a corrupt leadership. 
5. Checks and Balances 
Security-sector/police reform must also address questions of effectiveness and 
accountability and provide the necessary checks and balances for comprehensive 
oversight of police conduct and performance. The first step in accomplishing this is the 
establishment of a legal framework that protects suspects’ rights, of which the U.S. 
“Miranda warning” requirement is an example. The legal framework must extend to both 
internal and external oversight bodies that enforce laws specifically intended to limit 
police powers. 
a. Internal and External Oversight 
Internal oversight usually includes disciplinary units and an internal affairs 
office or commission. External oversight may include the “judicial system, legislative 
oversight committees, human rights ombudspersons, civilian commissions, ministry-level 
inspectors, human-rights NGOs, research organizations, and the media.”21 These 
oversight entities provide a layer of transparency or filter that can prevent institutional 
impunity and corruption within the security service. Because they can, in effect, police 
the police, such organizations can ensure greater public-service stability within a 
democracy in a number of ways: by their ability to regulate and implement promotions, 
budgets, and training; investigate and punish misconduct; and freely voice and display 
concerns or ideas. Internal oversight organizations must have extensive training and 
education in advance policing, government, and human rights and in addition be free 
from internal or organizational reprisal. External oversight organizations work best when 
they are formed and approved by the whole populace and are granted the freedom and 
legitimacy of authority from the government to act. 
But police reform takes time, and while the appropriate reforms are being 
debated and implemented, crime still occurs. Thus, during the reform phase, countries 
may be tempted to substitute police services with the military. Unfortunately, military 
                                                 
21 Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability, 9. 
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personnel are poorly trained and equipped for conducting domestic police duties. And as 
Call points out, “because choices during the interim stage of the reconstruction process 
may be difficult to reverse, they constrain permanent security arrangements. For instance, 
involving the military in public security may set an unfortunate precedent by blurring the 
line between military and police roles.”22  
B. MILITARY REFORM 
1. The Need for Reform 
Many transitional governments discover that reform of their military is one of 
their utmost priorities and ultimately necessity to ensure the stability of democratic 
governance. Typically, these new democracies are faced with bitter military-intervention 
legacies, which stem from the existence of a highly politicized military that intervenes at 
a moment’s notice and thus has had devastating consequences in terms of its affect on 
human rights and the economy.   
Samuel Fitch describes and breaks down modern civil-military relations vis-à-vis 
emerging democratic institutions into three distinct categories. First, the military 
establishment must be made subordinate to the democratically elected civilian 
government. Second, the military must accept civilian policy and bureaucracy as the 
legitimate governing and managing authority. Third, the rule of law must be extended to 
include military establishments.23  
Alfred Stepan has identified a key dimension of civil-military relations: 
articulated military contestation.24 The “dimension of articulated military contestation” 
deals with frictions between civilians and the military over enforcement and 
implementation of governmental control regulating polices of the military.25 Within this 
dimension he identifies three areas of contention: 1) the government’s prosecution of 
human rights violators, 2) governmental reforms vis-à-vis restructuring, an organizational 
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mission, and civilian oversight and preeminence at the top of the chain of command, and 
3) the inevitable desire of the government to control and possibly reduce military funding 
in order to allocate funds to more needy social sectors.26 The first area is most closely 
related to Fitch’s requirement that the military be subject to the rule of law, while the 
second and third correspond to Fitch’s assertion that civilians should have control over 
defense and military policy. In a democracy, a variety of actors within the state, political 
society, and civil society play a role in exercising effective civilian control over the 
military.27 
2. Making the Military Subordinate to Civilian Governmental Authority 
Historically, Latin American military institutions have perceived themselves, not 
the democratically elected public officials, as the “national guardians” or “defenders of 
the homeland.”28 As J. Samuel Fitch explains, this perspective is directly divergent from 
the fundamentals of democracy which hold that the national will belongs to the people, 
not the military: “The Latin American military’s traditional role as political arbiter or 
moderator is incompatible with democratic consolidation.”29 Accountability to the 
civilian government takes many forms, but the most essential is the military’s recognition 
of the authority and legitimacy of the democratic institutions. This then is considered one 
of the first and foremost parts of civil-military reform, which starts with the most basic 
steps. Civilian control and management of the military must start at a high level in 
democratic governments, such as the civilian defense ministers who have the ability to 
formulate and implement enforceable security polices. 
Stepan defines the term “political society” as the manner and ability by which 
“political contestation . . . [gains] control over public power and the state apparatus.”30 
More specifically, he explains, “political society” refers to how the population in a 
democracy participates, manages, chooses, and monitors its government through 
“political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, intraparty alliances, and 
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legislatures.”31 The lack of interest of political parties in defense issues, the weakness of 
legislative defense committees, and the scarcity of independent research capabilities all 
undermine the role that political society plays in monitoring the military, especially in the 
face of the “latent paranoia . . . military organizations . . . have about political 
‘interference’ in their professional activities.”32   
The “state” is defined as the linkage between the political society and the civil 
society that allows for state cohesion through its “administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and 
coercive” systems.33 Because of the traditional role of the military, transitional 
democracies in Latin American must redefine the realm in which state institutions may 
act. The military has played a vital role as one of the defining state actors and perceives 
state functions primarily in terms of its historical authoritarian/hierarchal role. Civil-
military relations experience friction as democratically elected officials attempt to assert 
civilian control over all aspects of the state, including the military and the ministry of 
defense.34 
a. Civilian Control 
Civilian control over the bureaucratic and policy spectrum relates to a 
number of areas, all of which, if effectively implemented, place civilian control firmly 
over the defense sector. This can be seen in the civilian control of defense/military 
budgetary-funds distribution; promotion boards; the formulation and implementation of 
defense/military policy and doctrine; and the holding of top management positions, such 
as the defense minister or secretary of defense, which have real administrative authority 
and power. In addition, “military officers manage considerable economic resources, 
intelligence agencies, . . . [and] paramilitary forces [which] are instruments of social 
control, and a militarized police also undertakes social control.”35 The executive and 
legislative branches must have independent authority over the entire security-sector’s 
budgetary and fiscal spending. In the eyes of some reformers, this requires the 
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privatization or liquidation of military-sector private enterprises.36 These enterprises lack 
transparency and allow the secret transfer of vast resources and funds to possibly 
inappropriate ends. In addition, a lack of proper oversight and supervision of the civilian 
ministries makes possible the misappropriation of economic capital.37  
But Diamint refers to an argument posed by Pion-Berlin and Hunter, that 
military “professionalization and the search for institutional objectives for the armed 
forces suffice to facilitate the military’s withdrawal from politics.”38 This ignores the way 
that political and institutional weaknesses – in particular, the lack of civilian interest and 
expertise in defense and security police – often undermine civilian control. Civilian 
defense ministries and policy makers lack the institutional knowledge and legitimacy to 
forcefully eliminate the military’s monopoly in this field.39 
In general, Latin American nations have not reevaluated their security-
sector doctrines, and typically continue with status-quo, Cold War scenarios. Thus, 
“weapons and equipment purchases generally do not derive from centralized planning.”40 
Even though the traditional mission – defense of the state’s national sovereignty and 
territory from interstate rivals – exists, it has only minimal impact on funding demands. 
New mission roles and requirements will be needed to keep the legitimacy of funding 
demands and maintain the level of combat effective troops. 
The term “civil society” pertains to what Stepan describes as community, 
religious, or professional organizations. These nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
often cooperate to protect and advance their interests and enhance their bargaining power 
with state actors.41 Because of the historical trend in Latin America of authoritarian 
military dictatorships and the consolidation of power within the elite class, the civilian 
populations tended to neglect the investment of human capital in education in civil-
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military affairs. With the exception of human-rights NGOs, few NGOs address issues 
related to civil-military affairs. As a result, with the transition to democracy and the 
desire of the duly elected civilian governments to rein in control of the security sector, 
there is a lack of legitimate civilian authority and competency in this area. Governments 
now confronted with a need for military reform seriously lack the capacity to undertake 
and ultimately implement and manage such reforms effectively.42  
b. The Rule of Law 
In many post-authoritarian democracies, military service members, when 
publicly accused of any number of crimes, are subject to the authority of the military 
judicial system, whether the crime occurred in the local or federal sector. Since military 
courts routinely lack transparency and balanced investigation techniques, this renders 
military members largely immune to the basic fundamentals of the rule of law. An air of 
impunity, collusion, and corruption are commonplace. Thus, Fitch argues that reform is 
necessary, so that “members of the armed forces are neither denied ordinary 
constitutional rights nor granted special legal privileges by law or by actual practice . . . 
[but are] subject to appropriate sanctions in a court of law.”43 
Institutional prerogatives cover a wide number of areas. Stepan lists 
eleven, but only one has to do with the rule of law. His second dimension, “military 
institutional prerogatives,” refers to those areas where, whether challenged or not, the 
military as an institution assumes it has an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, 
to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within 
extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between 
the state and political or civil society.”44 These can range from an ideology as the 
protector of the state, historical military interferences into government control 
politicizing the military, ownership and recipient of funds from state-owned enterprises, 
monopoly of governmental ministerial positions, and control over other security services 
such as the police and intelligence services.   
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C. REFORM OF THE GENDARMERIE 
In Latin America, Argentina’s National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional 
Argentina, or GNA) and its like are a relative novelty. Other contemporary examples 
exist only in Europe, in France, Spain, and Italy. Eric Carlson defines  the Gendarmerie 
as “a hybrid police/military organization” that has been able to cope with Argentina’s 
social, domestic, political, and security pressures with greater resiliency than the rest of 
her contemporary security agencies and organizations.45 Therefore, all the above 
mentioned police and military reforms have great pertinence and relevance to this issue.     
According to Hugo Frühling, the merger of military and police functions and 
roles, as in the “French gendarmerie, the Italian carabinieri, and the Spanish guardia 
civil, fuses domestic police forces with a military structure of discipline, ranks, and 
reserve status in the case of war.46 He further explains that this creates both advantages 
and disadvantages that draw questions regarding the entity’s compatibility with 
democracy, due to its functional relation to the military.47 The “lack of differentiation 
from the military,” Frühling argues, can cause these units to be involved in “functions in 
maintaining social order” and in counterinsurgency operations.48 The merger of military 
and police functions and roles often has a culminating effect, leading to the oppression of 
the civilian political system, which, in turn, results in the ultimate corruption or 
transformation of the police institution away from its original design. It becomes a 
policing institution that “lack[s] training in [the] basic police functions” that it will be 
called on to perform once the transition back to democracy begins.49 
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Given the arguments in the pertinent literature, it is hard to dispute the general 
conclusion that a democratic government’s security-service reform and subjugation to the 
civilian government will not only contribute to national stability, but also greater regional 
stability. The transitional governments that find it necessary to conduct security-sector 
reforms, however, typically discover that there is a serious limiting factor: the lack of 
resources. Thus, transitional nations often must struggle in their attempts to compensate 
for the lack of infrastructure, the requisite institutional strengths, human capital, 
economic capital, and political will. In those circumstances, external actors are and will 
continue to be valuable assets in providing necessary assistance, especially in the form of 
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ARGENTINA’S SECURITY 
SERVICES IN TRANSITION 
A. EFFECTS OF TRANSITION ON THE THREE BRANCHES: THE 
POLICE, MILITARY, AND GENDARMERIE 
Transition is a major theme of the literature dealing with Argentina’s security 
services, the military, the Gendarmerie, and the police force. All three branches were 
affected, directly or indirectly, by the domestic and international events.   Initially, the 
crisis caused by the loss of the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982, and domestic policy 
mismanagement produced by the Proceso led to the collapse of the military regime and 
the return to the civilian elected democracy.  The ensuing economic crisis of the 1980s, 
1990s and early 2000s led the new democracy to varying degrees of political insulation 
vis-à-vis each security service.  The effect has been high political insulation for the 
police, low for the military and marginal for the Gendarmerie, which has then determined 
the level of nationwide response: bureaucratic, political, social, and criminal. While the 
overall effect on the services was both positive and negative, its most disturbing aspect 
was the gradual decline of competency and effectiveness, and hence of the legitimacy of 
officially mandated uses of force.   
In Argentina, the police force suffers from decades of deficiency in proper 
governmental oversight, pay, accountability, training, and respect for human rights. This 
neglect has fostered a rapid rise in criminal activity – some of which is police-sanctioned 
– corruption, general fear from the lack of security, and a citizenry unwilling or unable to 
approach or work with the police officials. In most countries, when criminal activities 
increase, the civilian populations demand more law enforcement, but in Argentina, such 
demands have the potential to exacerbate the current problems. There is no clear sense of 
which programs work and which merely continue and extend the current law enforcement 
model. It is crucial, therefore, that Argentina take whatever measures are necessary to 
resolve this situation and bring the police back under government control. 
The Argentine Gendarmerie's transition has been a more different experience than 
that of their more autocratic cousin, the regular army. With only limited budgetary 
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support from the government, for a long period of time the Gendarmerie more or less had 
to fend for itself in economic, training and institutional terms. In that respect, it shared the 
same social and economic neglect by the government as Argentina’s civilian population. 
Those shared circumstances, and the Gendarmerie’s stationing in poor rural areas, not 
only created a common bond between the soldiers and the general citizenry, but also 
inspired the Gendarmerie’s increasing loyalty to their local and regional districts. Thus, 
the Gendarmerie, instead of being a military arm of the federal government it has the 
potential to rival for local and regional control. The question now is: Who has the 
monopoly of influence and who will take control in a time of crisis, the provinces or the 
federal government. . 
Lastly, history shows that, throughout most of the twentieth century, the 
Argentine military intervened repeatedly in the political arena. As a result, the military 
became highly politicized, part of the legacy of presidencies that were routinely 
interrupted by military coups. The constant political turnover left behind crippling 
economic policies; social injustices, including torture, murder, and disappearances during 
the so-called Dirty War; and a disastrous war in 1982 with the United Kingdom over the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands which ended in Argentina’s defeat.   
In 1983, democracy was restored in Argentina, but at a very heavy price for the 
military. To increase its political control, the new government put measures in place in 
the form of budget cuts that greatly limited the military’s sphere of operations. Since 
then, the armed forces have floundered, either unwilling or unable to cope with these new 
limitations. This ensuing inability is partly due to the lack of a unified command structure 
and inadequate government reforms, but even more so to the military’s own greedy 
tendency to try to keep everything “as is,” rather than seeking a more balanced cohesion.  
In brief, Argentina’s military is in crisis. At its current levels of readiness and 
training, the armed forces would be unable to successfully fulfill any potential major 




B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARGENTINA’S   SECURITY FORCES 
AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY 
1. Background 
Following Argentina’s 1983 transition back to democracy, a key aspect of the first 
two administrations was their attempt to gain control over the security services.  First, 
their priority was to gain “authority over decisions concerning the missions, organization, 
and employment of . . . [the] state’s military means” and to “compel the armed forces to 
accept civilian control.”50 The armed forces lost all credibility and were at the mercy of 
the newly elected government, which took advantage of the debilitating fall of the 
Proceso de Reorganization Nacional to begin military reforms.51 President Alfonsín 
reinforced the Minister of Defense’s powers by placing control of the armed services 
under the Ministry of Defense and creating a clear chain of command with civilians in 
control. By 1985, Defense budgeting had been slashed from 5.1 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) to 2.3 percent.52 Through these steps, Argentina gradually took 
control of the military budget, allocations, and resources. It has failed, however, to 
implement reforms that would require the armed forces to cooperate in determining the 
budget and in the allocation of roles and missions. It is apparent that Argentina’s 
“defense budgets . . . are prepared with little consideration for (real) defense needs.”53 As 
a result, the armed forces branches must fight each other for a share of the funding. 
As overwhelming as these problems were, there is interaction, at least, between 
the regular military and the government in relation to defense and security affairs. 
Unfortunately, there was little similar engagement at that level with either the 
Gendarmerie or the police force following democracy except for some elementary 
interaction  related  to  highly  publicized  deaths,  but  nothing  on  a  grand  scale.   
Experts on the area believe that neglect of these two entities could cause their  
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further institutional separation from governmental control and create more havoc and 
difficulty if and the state ever views this as a pressing issue. 
2. The Police and the Civilian Government  
The police system in Argentina is viewed primarily as a protection force whose 
use of force and violence is intended to deter criminals. However, the police routinely 
direct brutal tactics at the poor and minority groups, especially in the countryside. The 
use of torture also, which was an evident throughout the Dirty War, still goes on today, 
largely to obtain confessions of criminal acts. It has gained some acceptance among the 
general populace as an allowable use with so-called “common criminals,” because they 
are seen more or less as legitimate “torturable” subjects.54 The elite and the middle class 
are apparently exempt, in most cases, from such practices which are used predominately 
against the poor and undesirables. This may be one reason why brutal tactics and torture 
continue to be used. After prolonged periods of such treatment, victims will confess to 
anything, whether actually innocent or guilty. This practice causes many innocent 
persons to be jailed, while the guilty go free.  
The police use of deadly force, also used mostly in rural areas against minorities 
and the poor, is another widespread problem. Argentina has a special police units, 
members of the “brigade,” that are notoriously “trigger-happy.” During one instance in 
1994, when protestors finally drove President De la Rua from office, the police fired a 
total of 239 bullets to kill five innocent youths.  
What makes matters worse is the lack of accountability and impunity from the 
law, as both government officials and the judicial system seem to look the other way. In 
the rare cases when police officers are put on trial, they are either acquitted or given a 
slap on the wrist, or shifted to a military tribunal where the “buddy system” takes over. 
There has been very little oversight, and the oversight that exists is extremely limited, 
with officials unable or unwilling to push the matter forward. This creates an air of 
conspiracy when people who die under torture just disappear, severing the connection 
between them and the police. 
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These offenses could have a serious adverse effect on Argentina’s democratic 
development. Paul Chevigny argues that society cannot obtain “security through police 
lawlessness; precisely because it is lawless. . . . criminal justice loses its credibility.”55 
Argentina currently has an increasingly serious social problem, given the escalation in 
lawlessness up the social and economic food chain. The middle and upper classes are 
now often targets of kidnapping for ransom, in which Chevigny implies that, the police 
often have a hand. In addition, the upper classes often avoid the police because of the 
continual demand for bribes. 
3. The Military and the Civilian Government 
The 1930 military coup of President Yrigoyen, a major turning point in Argentine 
history, had haunting consequences for more than half a century. The military became a 
highly politicized machine and the die was cast for the military coups that followed in 
regular succession, “in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.”56 As noted by Robert 
Potash, however, the subsequent coups evolved into “much more than a military 
operation.”57 They were organized revolts led by military and civilian officials alike,58 
abetted by the average citizenry’s general lack of empathy for the democratic 
government. They had learned from past experience that a military government proved to 
be more efficient and therefore preferred military rule over governance by corrupt 
political cronies.59 The military became an unstoppable juggernaut, free to move in ways, 
whenever it thought necessary, that would further its own ambitions, with dependable 
support from the Argentine populace.    
The military government that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 is known to 
history as the Proceso, short for “National Reorganization Process.”  It is often described 
as the “tipping point” in regard to the general support for military dictatorships in 
Argentina. Its eventually collapse was owed to accumulated failures in three key areas: 
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the economy, human rights (the so-called Dirty War of 1976-1982), and military 
incompetence (the Falklands/Malvinas War). Glaring mistakes in all three areas 
eventually shattered the popular domestic and international trust in Argentine military 
institutions. 
a. Economic Blunders 
The junta’s elimination of protective tariffs and subsidies opened the 
Argentine economy to the global market, leading to a deluge of cheap foreign imports.  
Though industry took the brunt of the changes, this move also had a considerable impact 
on all forms of labor. From 1975 to 1980, the country’s industrial growth stalled, and 
then declined, as manufacturing dropped 15 percent and bankruptcies increased by 140 
percent.60 While the junta seemed content with the status quo, it angered and frustrated 
civilians from all sectors of the economy. 
b. Human Rights Blunders: The Dirty War 
Between 1976 and 1982, the Proceso conducted counterinsurgency 
operations against what they said were “left-wing subversives.” Those operations quickly 
became known as the “Dirty War.” The military had become extremely efficient in 
eliminating members of a small band – approximately five hundred guerillas – that they 
declared was a direct threat to the government.61 However, the operations soon evolved 
into a campaign of persecution directed at anyone who dared, whether overtly or 
covertly, criticize the Proceso.  
In many cases, state “justice” was both swift and undocumented: 
government criticism bore a very high price. Among historians, there is a wide range of 
estimates, but it is believed that some 10,000 to 30,000 people disappeared, the mostly 
forgotten victims of illegal arrest, torture, and execution. Although the government’s 
reasons fell largely under the “counterinsurgency” umbrella, there is also evidence of 
economic motivation. In addition to the disappearances, reports show that the homes of 
the accused were often looted of their valuables and then reallocated to military officers’ 
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families. Some were refurbished by special units and resold.62 The Dirty War affected all 
classes of society. None among them, neither the working nor the middle, not even the 
upper class, was safe as the government hunted “subversive” agents of every stripe.63   
With the collapse of the Proceso came investigations and trials for the 
atrocities. The sheer number of the military officials involved was staggering. As the 
courts became overburdened with the case loads, the military became increasingly 
frustrated and frightened. Ultimately, the armed forces lost not only all creditability but 
also the hard-won trust of the civilian populace. No one knew who within the armed 
services was innocent or guilty. 
c. Military Blunders: The Falklands/Malvinas War 
Leading up to and during the first weeks of the Falklands/Malvinas War, 
the Argentine military had a mistaken sense of confidence in its own competence and 
proficiency. The counterinsurgency operations against left-wing subversives had been 
hugely successful. And the junta interpreted this success – wrongly, as it turned out – as 
evidence that it possessed a viable armed force whose military might was matched that of 
other nations. This proved to be a disastrous miscalculation. 
On April 2, 1982, the Argentine forces received orders to invade the 
Falkland Islands, a British colony in the southwest Atlantic, which Argentines know as 
the Islas Malvinas. From the beginning, the invasion was a military and political fiasco. 
The Argentine naval and ground forces were no match for the British, and their envoys at 
the United Nations and in the United States were unable to stimulate peace talks that 
might have forestalled a military defeat. In an uncharacteristically blunt speech, the U.S. 
diplomat told his Argentine counterpart that the U.K. was coming to reclaim the islands 
and there was no way that Argentina could win. In addition, Argentina, handicapped by 
its lack of sufficient global strategic planning, wrongly assumed that the United States 
would intervene on its behalf, regardless of the U.S.-British relationship. 
In the end, Argentina’s defeat, combined with the economic strife and the 
effects of the Dirty War, destroyed the military’s self-image. “Military stature, unity, and 
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self-confidence declined measurably in Argentina by the time power was transferred to 
civilian hands.”64 Consequently, given their unfortunate transformation in the eyes of the 
people, the armed forces today are extremely reluctant to get involved in domestic issues. 
As a government institution, they are viewed with a good deal of suspicion. Though there 
are some signs that the armed forces have begun to rebound, they continue to operate 
under the watchful eye of both the Argentine government and the Argentine citizenry.  
From 1983 to 1990, Argentine’s new democracy successfully resisted no 
less than four attempts by the military to overthrow the civilian government. Among the 
reasons for the coups’ failures were the institutional legacies and the rivalries that 
remained from the Falklands/Malvinas debacle. When Argentina surrendered to the 
British forces at Port Stanley and the Argentine Air Force and the Navy withdrew from 
the junta, the Army was left to fend for itself. The resulting fractures in the military are 
still evident today.65   
Directly following the fall of the junta numerous complaints by the 
general populace of human rights abuses led to investigations and the prosecution of 
Proceso military officers, but these have proved to be the most difficult for the civilian 
government to conduct to a satisfactory end. The dissolution of the Proceso brought 
transparency, as human rights groups exposed the military’s involvement in vast 
atrocities across the nation.66 And one of President Alfonsín’s primary reform mandates 
was the punishment of military officers for their human rights violations. Arrest warrants 
were signed and tribunals conducted. Military officers waited anxiously on the sidelines, 
not knowing what to expect or what would happen to them and their institution.   
Their uncertainty and fear of the unknown had a “blowback” effect, 
triggering four attempts at a military coup composed primarily of junior officers who 
hoped to save themselves and protect the military institution from the new democracy. 
The most significant of the coup attempts, led by Lt. Col. Aldo Rico and known as the 
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Semana Santa Rebellion, occurred in 1987 during Holy Week. It ended in negotiations 
between Rico and President Alfonsín, which included a generous concession to the 
military – amnesty for the military’s involvement in human rights violations.67 
The military’s fundamental failure, in joint operability, sustainment, and 
support, has played well for the early post-junta reform-minded civilian politicians. 
Nonetheless, for all their success in implementing reform in economics, civil-military 
affairs, military subjugation, and the realignment of doctrine and strategic policies, they 
have failed in the area of human rights. In the 1980s, that failure – the sole obstacle to the 
reform process –lent an at least unofficial taint to President Alfonsín’s administration. 
4. The Gendarmerie and the Civilian Government 
In respect to the roles they perform, the Argentine Gendarmerie68 is situated 
somewhere between the police and the military. They function as a “hybrid police-
military force charged with numerous responsibilities, including customs control, 
antinarcotics, counterterrorism, and environmental protection throughout Argentina.”69 
Like the regular forces, the economic circumstances, the Dirty War, and their residential 
location have considerably affected the way they perceive their relationship with the 
civilian population. 
Many young men from poor rural areas see the green uniform of the Gendarmerie 
as a prestigious symbol.70 And what separates this branch of service from the others is 
mainly contained in the word “poor.” Unlike the regular armed forces, the Gendarmerie 
is poorly funded. Salaries are low and basic provisions, such as medical care, food while 
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away from the average citizen but rather amongst the population. And thus, from 
Gendarmerie clashes with local protestors has come the term, “the poor against the 
poor.”71 
But the Gendarmerie perception of its members “as poor worker[s], shaken by the 
same economic disasters as the protesters” and the legacy of the Dirty War, has also had 
many positive outcomes.72 When confronted by an angry mob, the Gendarmerie showed 
restraint, only using proportional force. While this may seem merely a rational response, 
during the Proceso, protestors were often tortured, shot, or simply “disappeared,” by the 
military and police.   
Argentina’s federal judiciary, regional governors, and the president all have 
considerable control over the Gendarmerie forces. The Gendarmeries’ empathy for the 
common man, however, has the potential to rival that control. They associate much of 
their own plight with that of the protestors and consider themselves, as a whole, as gente 
sufrida (suffering people).73 Thus, if a class struggle should occur, there is a real 
possibility that the government could lose its control over the Gendarmerie forces. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Argentina is not a failed state. It has recovered from the political, social, and 
economic devastation of the Proceso and come out of the 2001–2003 economic crises 
with its democratic institutions intact. Argentina has quickly put into effect the social, 
political, and economic reforms needed to steer the nation away from repeating its past. 
At the same time, however, the institutions that protect democracy have been neglected, 
owing in large part to a reluctance to confront fully the historical legacy left behind by 
prolonged experience of military rule. The armed forces were much more vulnerable to 
reform processes than they had been in the past because of their patent failure during the 
Proceso period. Their protagonism in government focused the attention of democratizers 
on reforming this institution, but this then meant that the reform of the police and the 
Gendarmerie were neglected. Since neither was likely to threaten the hold of democratic 
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politicians on power, they did not attract the same level of attention from reformers. 
However, if those institutions are to realize their full potential value to the Argentine 
nation their reform must continue. Security is a requirement for a democratic 
government, as for any other. That security must come from legitimate, trustworthy 
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IV. PROPOSED REFORMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we present both the proposed and the implemented government 
reform measures for Argentina’s three security-sector branches during the most recent 
democratic period: the police, the military, and the Gendarmerie.  We argue that the 
police have resisted comprehensive reform, while the military has been compelled to 
embrace it.  This difference in outcomes is explained by the nature of their relationships 
to the civilian political leadership, and to the social elites that they represent: the police 
are insulated from reformist pressure because they are in a position to provide the civilian 
leadership with opportunities and prerogatives that its members value; whereas the armed 
forces, having been thoroughly discredited by their own performance in power, enjoy no 
such political insulation.  The experience of the Gendarmerie with reform occupies a 
middle ground.  It has undergone only moderate reform because it has not been directly 
implicated in the major crises of the past.  But it lacks connection to Argentine political 
and social elites, and hence does not enjoy the kind of insulation from reformist pressure 
that these groups afford the police. 
B. THE POLICE 
To examine the Argentine police, we focus primarily on the Buenos Aires 
Provincial Police (BAPP), the largest urban police force in the nation. The BAPP area of 
authority contains roughly one third of the domestic population and the national capital. 
By singling out this one police force, we can better collect and examine pertinent reform 
data that can then be applied generally throughout the nation.   
The Buenos Aires Provincial Police have traditionally acted, not as a government 
agent for the good of the people, but as a government tool for political enforcement that 
placed civilian human rights, liberty, and justice at risk. During the years of multiple 
military regimes, the police force developed a rightist, state-centered cast. That 
militarization process corrupted its organizational framework and led to “strongly illegal 
secret practices and attitudes in police work that were never checked on or altered by the 
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various civilian administrations that have followed with the return to democracy.”74 The 
chain of command was already highly centralized prior to the Proceso of 1976–1983, 
during which it underwent a transformation into an “ultra-hierarchical and highly military 
structure.”75  
Historically police forces in Argentine have always been organized to play a 
militarized role in the service of the elite, by protecting it from labor unrest and other 
social upheavals. As evidence of this, Sain notes that “from 1880 to 1955, 30 out of 47 
chiefs of the federal police force were military men.”76 In addition, the police have 
largely been “silent” servants: they serve their masters unconditionally and 
unquestioningly, whether they are the civilian elite or a military dictatorship. A key issue 
involved in that service, however, is that the military structure of the police links their 
highly selective and centric service directly to, around, and for distinct, individual 
classes, not the overall common citizenry.77  
During the Proceso, the BAPP was incorporated into counterinsurgency units 
under the command of the military, specifically the First Army Corps, and, in that role, 
cooperated in the antiterrorist operations of the Dirty War.78 The BAPP is known to have 
participated in the numerous human-rights violations, disappearances, murders, and 
torture of thousands of Argentine civilians that took place in “secret detention camps.”79   
Throughout the 1980s, police reform was not a pressing priority for Argentina’s 
new democracy due mostly to its preoccupation with the military.  During this early time 
of new democracy, the transitional government was singularly focused on dealing with 
the dethroned Proceso junta, and the institutional subjugation of the elements that 
supported the former military regime.   
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It was not until 1991, when Eduardo Duhalde was elected governor of Buenos 
Aires Province that significant police reform was attempted, with disturbing and 
paradoxical effects. Intentionally or not, Duhalde allowed for a greater allocation of 
resources, funds, and material to the BAPP, while at the same time granting it “a broad 
degree of freedom of maneuver in its activities, and the promise . . . of governmental 
noninterference in the institutional activities and practices.”80 The latter action in effect 
insulated the policing institution from any external oversight or review. The BAPP no 
longer had to maintain basic services for the people, and began to fail as a legitimate 
agent of the government.   
From late 1991 to mid 1997, the crime rate in Buenos Aires Province increased 
considerably, while, at the same time, there were low conviction rate police officers who 
were terminated because of criminal collusion. During that period, “3,805 officers were 
terminated [8 percent of the force] . . . of whom 3,418 were legally charged and /or tried 
for the commission of various offenses. Among this last group, 60 percent were tried for 
robbery, abuse of authority, and/or falsification of public evidence, while the remaining 
40 percent included homicide, light and serious injuries, torture, criminal fraud, and the 
illegal sale of drugs.”81 
In response, between 1997 and 1998, there were several attempts in the province 
to stop the police abuse of civilian civil rights. Key aspects of that reform included the 
decentralization of government control, in favor of greater regional municipal control, 
and a structural reorganization of specific police roles and duties, with emphasis on the 
segregation of specific police-service responsibilities and authorities from its current 
broad and overarching institution.  The reforms also eliminated the role of the provincial 
chief of police and the separation of security roles. The Ministerio Público Fiscal [need 
English translation] was duly created as the sole institution responsible for criminal 
investigations. This ministry was also responsible for managing the policía judicial 
(judicial police), which serves the courts.82  
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Other reform proposals at the time called for the following: greater civilian 
oversight; reform of the entire police ideology – from its responsibility to protect the 
government to its responsibility to defend individual citizens; granting local leaders 
(mayors, councilmen) and social organizations parity in local power relative to the 
governors; and reform of the traditional techniques of criminal investigation. Security- 
reform scholars have been advocating such proposals for years as comprising proper 
reform policy. But, as Kent Eaton notes, regarding the fundamental frictions, “each of 
these reform proposals goes against the grain of Argentine policing as it has long been 
practiced.”83    
During that brief period, late 1997 to mid 1998, the government initially 
responded by attempting to implement and insert civilian leadership into the police 
system. “Duhalde himself decree[d] the civilian takeover of the Buenos Aires Police and 
the naming of Luis Lugones as the new police head.”84  Thus, there was a real, concerted 
effort to establish a basis for reform, but, as we will show, the lack of political stability 
and institutional follow-through ended any meaningful transformation.  
Major reorganization and reform occurred in August 1998, with the enactment of 
a Public Security Law, No. 12,154, and a law for the Organization of the Police of 
Buenos Aires Province, No. 12,155.85 More specifically, Law 12,154 deals with public 
security matters that involve the creation and development of community participation. 
Law 12,155 instituted three new police divisions that were designed as “civilian 
institutions of an armed, hierarchical, and professional character.”86 The three divisions – 
the Departmental Security Police, the Investigatory Police with Judicial Duties, and the 
Highway Safety Police – comprised specific, specialized sectors, encompassing not only 
law enforcement, but also security and public service. 87   
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The Departmental Security Police was mandated for crime prevention and the 
maintenance of public safety within the eighteen judicial departments of Buenos Aires 
Province. Each of the eighteen departments was granted “functional, administrative, and 
financial autonomy,” but the General Directorate of Operative Coordination retained 
overall control for coordination.88  In addition, given its mandate for crime prevention, an 
intelligence sector was established under the supervision and direction of the General 
Directorate for the Evaluation of Information.  
The Investigatory Police with Judicial Duties was charged with “criminal 
investigations at the request and under the orders of the appropriate judicial authority,” 
with specific reference to the development and maintenance of skill sets for 
“investigations of complex crimes and drug trafficking . . . [and] all technical and 
scientific studies that might be required for a court trial.”89  The Investigatory Police was 
divided into eighteen Departmental Investigatory Branches, linked to the General 
Directorate for Complex Crimes, Narco-Crimes, and the General Directorate for a 
Scientific Police.90 The Highway Safety Police title is self-explanatory: they were 
charged with maintaining public order and safety in respect to the “transit and transport 
of people.”91 
C. THE MILITARY  
Immediately after the retreat of the Proceso from political control, Argentina’s 
first two democratic presidents, Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) and Carlos Menem (1989–99), 
respectively a radical and a Peronist, implemented civil-military reform of the security 
forces. Initially, the reforms were ground-breaking and a definite step in the right 
direction for democracy in the nation. It was widely understood that this type of reform 
was inevitable and justifiable for a transitioning democracy, whose claim of legitimacy 
requires it to subordinate the national armed forces to the duly elected democratic 
government. 
                                                 





In Argentina, the reforms that took place, especially in the early years, comprised 
the most basic and fundamental concepts of civil-military affairs. Argentina’s new 
democracy placed the military firmly under the control of the elected civilian 
government. It accomplished this by interposing a civilian defense ministry in the chain 
of command that the military was subservient to, by limiting the military’s mission to one 
of external defense and limited foreign peacekeeping operations, and by strict budget 
allocations vis-à-vis the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). More important, it did so while 
at the same time preventing the politicians and the bureaucracy from enabling the 
military to continue its traditional practice of bullying to get what it wanted.   
Though the two presidents’ aims were the same, their methods differed 
significantly. Alfonsín took a heavy-handed approach, slashing budgets and purging the 
ranks, while Menem used indirect methods, while pointing to the on-going economic 
crisis to legitimize continuation of his reforms. In all, while the reforms had varying 
degrees of effectiveness, they met the primary goal of making the military subservient to 
government control.  In subsequent chapters, we discuss the successes and the short-
comings of these reforms. 
“Weakening of the military is a necessary condition for major reform” and 
internal security in transitional democracies.92 In Argentina, the Falklands/Malvinas and 
Dirty War campaigns, the Junta’s blundering mismanagement of the economy, and the 
military’s loss of credibility and public acceptance worked together to create the “war 
transition” situation, in effect a power vacuum borne of military failure, that was 
necessary for democracy to move back in.93  
Alfonsín’s method of defense reform is often seen as a “politically weakening” of 
the military, using drastic budget cuts as a tactic.94 In comparison, Menem’s budget cuts 
came more from a concern for national macro-economic fiscal survival. Alfonsín’s style 
might also be seen as a personal attempt to place the military under the heel of the 
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civilian government, whereas Menem took advantage of the general perception that he 
was an even-handed distributor of fiscal responsibility, in order to impose overlapping 
state and military budget reforms. 
Under the Proceso the military became accustomed to certain prerogatives and 
privileges. By 1978, military spending had increased by 800 percent through foreign 
loans, mortgaging of military-owned enterprises, and pressure on the federal bank to 
release foreign currency and print domestic notes. Alfonsín’s finance minister’s fiscal 
creed was “That there shall be money on hand to pay the bills.”95 In 1988, the military’s 
prerogatives were limited by the introduction of the Defense Law, which drastically cut 
and defined the mission of the combined armed services by prohibiting them from 
planning for internal missions and conflicts.96 
Alfonsín sought to civilianize the Ministry of Defense (MOD)97 under two 
different men, first, Raúl Borrás, and then Roque Carranza. Both were personal 
confidants of Alfonsín and loyal to the Radical Party.98 “Both were bound and 
determined to see the president’s military programs through to completion – however 
unpopular they were with the men of arms.”99 That does not mean that they were pure 
automatons for the president, however. They were faithful advocates for their respective 
departments, but saw defense cuts as necessary. Their ultimate goal was “preserving the 
operational capacity of the armed forces while eliminating activities that did not serve 
territorial defense needs.”100 By the time Alfonsín left office in July 1989, with the help 
of his civilian defense ministers, he had reduced military spending to just less than two 
percent of GDP. 
In 1989, Alfonsín implemented Decree 83/89, thereby “incorporating military 
branch chiefs and the joint chiefs into governmental command-and-planning structures 
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for internal security. He established a Committee for Internal Security, permitting an 
intelligence role and new emergency internal powers for the military. A 1991 Internal 
Security Law reopened the military’s role in some forms of internal conflicts.”101 When 
Carlos Menem assumed the presidency in July 1989, he “quickly pardoned the military 
mutineers, an act that only heightened the perception of civilian vulnerability to military 
provocation. Menem’s reprieve capped off a successful drive by elements within the 
military to end what they saw as a campaign of judicial persecution waged against them. 
It also seemed to be an admission that civilian strategies of confrontation with the 
military would simply not work. The Menem government signaled its desire for a more 
amicable approach with the appointments of Italo Louder and Humberto Romero as his 
first two ministers of defense.  Both men enjoyed close ties with the armed forces.”102  
Carlos Menem entered the office of the president six months early in the wake of 
a hyperinflation crisis that had reached the level of 5,000 percent. Menem was able to 
take advantage, knowingly or unknowingly, of this national emergency by implementing 
military reform through the indirect guise of national financial reconstruction, with little 
to no blowback or reprisal to his administration. One of the crucial reforms Menem 
implemented was a restructuring and institutional strengthening of the Central Bank, in 
March 1990, by prohibiting the “Central Bank from financing the operation deficit of the 
Treasury, or from engaging in any monetary expansion without prior authorization from 
the economics ministry.”103  
The appointment of a strong finance minister, Domingo Cavallo, in February 
1991, brought about further financial reforms that had direct and indirect impact on the 
armed forces. He dollarized the economy, improved tax collection, implemented speedy 
privatization programs for state-owned enterprises, cut federal spending, froze wages, 
and, by 1992, reduced federal employees by 15.4 percent.104 This “surgery without 
anesthesia” was harsh, but widely excepted by the public and, grudgingly, by the 
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military.105 By 1993, military spending was 1.3 percent of GDP and 10.6 percent of 
public sector expenditures, down from 1989’s 1.9 percent of GDP and 18.2 percent of 
public sector expenditures.106 In addition, “the government’s account balance moved 
from a deficit of 6.1 percent in 1990 to a surplus of 1.5 percent in 1992.  Retail and 
wholesale prices adjusted accordingly. Inflation . . . dropped to single digits by August of 
. . . 1991.”107 
During the Menem administration, pacification of the military was obtained 
through strict adherence to budget guidelines and granting amnesty to military personnel 
from war crimes tribunals.  Menem also understood that active involvement in 
international peace-keeping operations would keep the military busy while lifting its 
institutional and national esteem. Peacekeeping missions also had the advantage of 
reemphasizing an apolitical professionalism in the armed forces and simultaneously 
helping to advance Menem’s foreign policy. In a certain sense, the armed forces briefly 
regained some political insulation during the Menem presidency because they were once 
again perceived as useful to the civilian leadership. However, this insulation would 
disappear during the politically turbulent period that followed the end of the Menem 
administration.    
In the years between 2001 and 2003, Argentina suffered one of the region’s worst 
economic disasters.  During that period, Buenos Aires and many other cities had a huge 
exponential inflation rate, with a migration of capital to foreign currency. 53 percent of 
the population dropped below the poverty line, and maximum withdrawal amounts were 
set by Argentine banks.108 The Argentine populace poured into the streets with massive 
protests, which historians consider some of the most violent in decades. Throughout the 
riots the civilian government maintained control by directing the police and other security 
services to contain the violence and protect public and private interests. The military, 
                                                 
105 Call, "War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America," 124. 
106 Ibid., 125. 
107 Pion-Berlin, 124. 
108 David Pion-Berlin and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact of 
Military Domestic Roles in Latin America,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology (summer 2005): 
14–15. 
 42
however, following the dictates of a government directive, remained in the barracks, even 
after a turbulent December 2001, during which a total of four Argentine presidents came 
and went. Showing their trust in the lawmakers’ ability to fill the power vacuum, the 
military did not intervene, but allowed them to work, in keeping with the Constitution. 
Only when the civilian government gave the order did the armed forces deploy, to once 
again become involved in a domestic affair. And, for its part, the government continued 
to maintain direct oversight, to ensure that the armed forces implemented only its specific 
humanitarian mission, nothing more. 
D. THE GENDARMERIE 
The origin of Argentina’s Gendarmerie reform is similar to many of the other 
security-service reforms that emerged with the collapse of the Proceso and the return of 
an elected civilian democracy. Gendarmerie reform began in 1983 with the transfer of its 
operational authority and control from the Defense Ministry back to the Ministry of the 
Interior. Other than that, however, the administrative and formal structure of the 
Gendarmerie changed very little. Its most significant alteration occurred in its 
government roles, functions, and missions, and the way they were to conduct those 
missions.109   
The enactment of Internal Security Law Number 24.059 in 1992 gave sole 
responsibility for counterinsurgency and antiterrorism operations to the Gendarmerie, 
removing those functions from the military. This move made it apparent that the GNA 
had crossed into areas that were formerly the exclusive preserve of the military and the 
police. There were several reasons for this redistribution: historically, the Gendarmerie 
had never been involved in political intervention and abuses. Thus, there was still a high 
level of public and political confidence in their professionalism and their ability to 
accomplish missions.110 With the expansion of the Gendarmerie’s role, they became 
Argentina’s first civilian-controlled antiterrorist unit. Since then, the GNA has continued 
to take on new roles, spanning from narcotics interdiction and filling police-manning 
shortfalls (mostly due to police strikes) to employment in the enforcement of 
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environmental laws.  Fulfilling these roles has been seen as occupying “the grey zone” 
between the duties of the military and the police. 111 
Further reform of the Gendarmerie’s mandate can be found in the combination 
and incorporation of sections of several documents: Article 14 of the 1994 reformed 
Argentine Constitution, Article 194 of the Penal Code, and National Gendarmerie Law 
Number 19.349.112 Article 14 stipulates that the national highways and bridges must 
remain free and clear for all of the nation’s populace to use. In addition, this 
infrastructure must be void of illicit activity.113 Article 194 of the Penal Code makes it 
illegal to impede, upset, or slow “the normal functioning of transports by land, water, or 
air; of the public services of communication; of the provision of water, electricity, or the 
energy sources.”114 National Gendarmerie Law 19.349 gives specific guidance when and 
where the GNA is to intervene and act. Article 3 of the law refers to public order: the 
Gendarmerie is charged with quelling public disturbance or subversion, supplementing 
police forces or replacing them if the police are unable to maintain order or when there 
are resemblances of guerrilla activity. Article 5 of the law deals with expressed and 
implied jurisdictions of the GNA. Section B expressly defines tunnels and international 
bridges as the domain of the GNA, while Sections C and D state that in any other place in 
the nation, as dictated by the executive or federal justice branches of government, the 
GNA is to maintain national order and tranquility.115 
E. CONCLUSION 
As seen above, reform of Argentine security services achieved degrees of success.  
Police reforms only made limited progress. Here, Duhalde nullified the potential 
effectiveness of his own budgetary measures when he let go of the reins of the police and 
granted them greater fiscal independence.  He used his governor prerogative to appoint a 
new head of police in an attempt to civilianize the force, but the political nature of the 
appointment only added to the insulation of the police from political pressure. Military 
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reforms made the greatest progress since Alfonsín and Menem used the momentum of the 
post-Falklands military crisis to cut the military’s historical prerogatives and redefine 
defense organization.  The military no longer had a mandate to intervene in politics, 
civilians controlled the chain of command in the MOD, and the defense budget was 
strictly maintained in accordance with the civilian fiscal policy. The GNA for its part 
experienced little crisis, having played a marginal role throughout the Proceso, and it had 
nothing to lose in the way of political prerogatives.  Therefore, its reform process was 
less painful.  The GNA was moved back to the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and 
directed to perform a variety of roles that once belonged solely to the military or the 
police.  However, this did not translate into reforms affecting its operations or internal 
structures.   
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V. REFORMS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the full and partial reform successes for the police, the 
military, and the Gendarmerie (GNA) as well explore the respective reform failures.  In 
both discussions, it is important to realize that the outcomes of each reform effort, 
whether positive or negative, were influenced by either the absence or the presence of 
one of two key circumstances: either there was a current crisis or there was political 
insulation.   
As stated in the introduction, the opportunity for reform is created by crisis, and 
limited by the degree of insulation from reform provided by politicians.  In Argentina, 
crises stemming from economic collapse, failed military regimes, failed military 
campaigns, and non-judicial killings ultimately exerted enough public pressure to drive 
the government to implement improvements.  In Argentina, political insulation is a 
reflection of the extra-legal that sometimes prevails between the political leadership and 
the various security services on which that leadership depends.  Political insulation will 
vary with the perceived threat or advantage of each service in relation to the political 
class, and therefore, translate into the viability of reform.   
Since the transition to democracy in 1984, the police have suffered only a minor 
level of crisis while retaining a high level of political insulation, whereas the military has 
undergone crises with exponentially diminishing political insulation.  Finally, the 
Gendarmerie has experienced only marginal to nonexistent crisis while enjoying little or 
nothing in the way of political insulation. Over time, this has meant that reform of the 
military institution has progressed the furthest, despite occasional resistance, while the 
police remain unreformed. The GNA have not been heavily affected by this process, 
except to acquire responsibility for counter-terrorism and internal order missions. The 




B. POLICE    
1. The Successes 
The late 1990’s break-up and division of the duties and responsibilities of the  
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) into specific sectors – traffic enforcement, 
criminal investigation, and judicial responsibilities – went a long way toward limiting 
institutional collusion, increasing specialized training and job performance, and creating 
specific mandates for individual officers and police divisions.  
In addition to the BAPP force-division reforms, the government created a new 
security-sector agency with an independent role outside of and beyond the standard 
police role, crime prevention and investigation. Also, the Service for the Custody and 
Transport of Prisoners was now mandated to operate the police holding stations and 
formal jails and was responsible for the deposit and removal of detained personnel under 
the direction of designated authorities. The latter change meant that the police no longer 
had the authority to transport, or to be the custodians of, criminally charged suspects.  
In August 1998, a new security-management and oversight organization was 
implemented: the Ministry of Justice and Safety. The organization was given a wide 
range of responsibilities:  
organizing and managing provincial police groups and the activity of 
private security firms; to coordinate the relations of the police and the 
community; to investigate, plan, and implement acts of police intelligence 
conducive to the prevention of crime; and planning, coordinating across 
different jurisdictions, and carrying out actions for the struggle against 
narco-trafficking in the area of its competence.116   
The reaction by police officers to reform by way of purges was largely affable, 
though somewhat limited. Between late December 1997 and mid 1998, twelve hundred 
police officers were relieved from duty. Though numerous court charges were also being 
filed, this rather drastic reform apparently incited little to no resistance from the affected 
officers. For the June 1998 purge of three hundred and nine inspectors and assistant 
inspectors, for example, León Arslanián, a lawyer at the time, led a small protest by 
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dismissed officers outside the Ministry of Justice and Safety.117 In effect, the purveyors 
of force, the police – who might be expected to form protest groups that would react with 
possible or probable violence – did not. And possibly for that reason, some of the purged 
police’s greatest champions were the Peronist mayors from Buenos Aires Province.  
However, some proactive measures are now being implemented, with limited and 
varying success. There are attempts at new regulations and setting minimum levels of 
education as prerequisites for those seeking employment as police officers. An increase 
in police salaries, as a means to diminish bribes and other forms of corruption, is also 
being instituted. In addition, human-rights training is now administered in conjunction 
with stricter adherence to human-rights laws, the police are being removed from the 
jurisdiction of military courts, and police trials are being opened to the media and the 
public.  
2. The Failures 
In regard to the police, Saín identifies fourteen “institutional defects” that are the 
source of [its] inefficiency. 
 





1.  The inadequate way in which the direction, coordination, and 
control of the policing system are carried out by its top leaders 
2.  Is extremely top-heavy in  resources and personnel 
3.  A significant fragmentation and compartmentalization of 
police functions between the principal branches of the police 
and among the different units that make them up  
4.  Lack of a system set up for the recording, classification, and 
constantly updated analysis of the provincial crime situation 
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5.  Absence of a doctrine and specialized structures for the 
production of intelligence of serious crime prevention 
6.  Absence of  an integrated criminal database or the regional 
statistics that contain criminal acts vis-à-vis assailants  
7.  Police routinely perform nonpolicing tasks. 
8.  Administrative nonpolice tasks divert large numbers of needed 
police man-hours. 
9.  Lack of community policing oriented to the prevention and 
elimination of lesser crimes, minor social conflicts, unrest, and 
marginal, localized public disorder 
10.  Lack of a highly trained group that specializes in investigation 
of sophisticated and organized crime 
11.  Lack of a career professionalization that rewards merit-based 
initiatives, such as training qualifications and performance 
evaluation of individual officers 
12.  Existence of police careers built on the basis of a single 
professional group 
13.  Predominance of criteria of subordination and hierarchy as a 
means of better institutional control  
14.  Absence of criteria and structures for ongoing specialized 
police skill-building and training, given the priority for 
creating a generalist police type 
 
Within the BAPP itself, growing criminality is another area for concern. Incidents 
involving “poor treatment, torture, their refusal to provide protection, blackmail and 
extortion, corruption, arbitrary arrest, falsification of evidence, the collection of money 
for police protection, as well as participation in criminal activities and the cover-up of 
such complicity” were commonplace.119 At a certain point, the actions of corrupt BAPP 
officers allowed them to operate in an organized-crime fashion, first, by just being 
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members of an intricate and covert fraternal organization that has vast resources and 
authority and that provides its members with impunity from the rule of law while they 
conduct and profit from illicit activities. This impunity had an escalatory effect. BAPP 
sponsored or participated in criminal actions that included the “sale of drugs, the 
dismantling of stolen cars, robberies carried out by hijackers, and kidnapping,” and, in 
sum, bear the hallmark of organized crime. 
Traditionally, the police were the servants of politicians involved in legal and 
illicit activities, to the greatest extent under the Peronist government.120 The current 
policing structure at the time had been devised under President Peron in the 1950s. It was 
formulated as an organizational control structure for his party to manipulate the power of 
the policing system in their favor. Argentina’s federal system created a situational power 
struggle between the provincial, or state, governors and municipalities, local or town 
leaders, in regard to police control and supervision. Little to no local oversight of political 
control was granted within the provinces. In addition, in respect to the governor, the 
provincial legislative body was weak. All this is Argentina’s legacy from Perón in the 
1940s and 1950s.  
Perón granted provincial governors great autonomy and power over many aspects 
in their territories. One of these aspects was their control over the police, which included 
governoral prerogatives such as the naming of provincial police chiefs. In return, the 
governors shored up Perón’s power by lending him police support in times of need.121 As 
we will see later, this historical heritage continues today. Indeed, the collusion and 
corruption have evolved. 
Reactions among the politicians at all levels – municipal, provincial, and federal –
had a loggerhead effect which, ultimately, resulted in a series of counter-reforms in an 
attempt to reestablish the connection of influence, corruption, and power between the 
state elites (i.e., the politicians) and the police agencies. However, a major stumbling 
block for police reform in Argentina has been a distracting, so-called “White Elephant,” 
the military. Continuous military coups culminated in the despicable actions of the 
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Proceso: the 10,000–30,000 lives destroyed in the Dirty War, the debacle of the 
Falklands/Malvinas campaign, and the economic crisis they created. All of these factors 
combined pushed the public and political agendas for military reform well ahead of the 
policing sector. The irony of it is that the police were a notable part of the previous 
military regime, and an active participant in just about every aspect of the authoritarian 
government. But the idea, or concept, of the military as “the actor the can end 
democracy” has, in the recent past, gone a lot further than merely viewing the police as 
“the actors whose routine abuses threaten the full exercise of civil and political rights” 
vis-à-vis reform.122  
The lack of sector-specific roles for the police in Argentina’s security field has 
produced a dangerous merger of authorities, responsibilities, and prerogatives that have 
serious implications for the civil rights and freedoms of the general populace. Kent Eaton 
sees this happening due to police interaction in the judicial and penal systems, which 
places the demand for “crime investigation and crime prevention” on the police.123 
Therefore, the police were given a greater latitude and highly flexible authority over the 
populace, which did not translate into transparent and fair civil rights, due to their being 
under constant pressure from these highly dynamic responsibilities. To service these two 
mandates “police officers . . . can detain individuals without warrants, hold them for 
significant periods of time and . . . substantially control the investigation into the alleged 
crimes.”124 
3. Crisis and Political Insulation 
As seen above, the BAPP did undergo what can be perceived of as minor levels of 
crisis through their actions of non-proportional use of force, non-judicial killings, and 
their involvement in the Dirty War from the late 1970s through the 1990s, which led to 
the public outcry for reforms.  The result was only the implementations of minor reforms 
in the form police duty segregation (i.e. traffic enforcement, criminal investigation, and 
judicial responsibilities), small police force personnel purges, and minimal effort on the 
                                                 




part of court tribunals to prosecute general lawlessness, human rights and corruption 
crimes.  The primary friction that prevented full implementation of these reforms from 
the perceived crisis was the political insulation of the engrained political legacy of 
Argentina’s political institutions and parties.  The legacy of the Perónist party has made 
the politicians accustomed to, and somewhat dependent, on the power the police afford 
them within the political establishment.   They were unwilling to relinquish the power 
provided to them by the police.  The federal system still provided the provincial 
governors’ great autonomy and power, with little oversight, over the control the police.  
This included governoral prerogatives, such as the naming of provincial police chiefs.125 
Serious and meaningful reform would remove this advantage from the politicians and 
weaken their exertive force over polices, power, and even their rivals.  Serious crisis 
would have occur that would affect the politicians and the police at the same time to 
fracture the political insulation of the police, thereby causing some sort of transparency 
that could destroy or reform the status-quo political institution and its prerogatives while 
at the same time restructuring and reforming the police.126  
C. THE MILITARY 
1. The Successes  
From 1984 to 1993, the military’s general frustration with the basic wage levels 
and defense budget expenditures was palpable. However, they were powerless to effect 
change and their pleas fell on deaf ears. President Menem responded by saying, “The 
military cannot discuss salaries because they are not a union, and if their incomes are 
low, so too are those of other sectors of the community.”127 In 1991, in response to recent 
funding allocations that would drastically reduce the military’s offensive capabilities, 
Vice Admiral Antonio Mozarelli protested that the Argentine military was now restricted. 
It could only “adopt a strategy of containment, with no capacity to project offensive 
power.”128 Menem relieved the admiral of his command. What the admiral failed to 
realize was that the new civilian government did not want a military with an offensive 
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capability at that time. Containment had become a suitable alternative to  
Argentina’s potential for power projection in the region. 
The creation in September 1984 of the Department of Programming and 
Budgetary Control further insulated the “civilian policymakers from military 
influences.”129 The problem was that, in the past, when the Argentine armed forces 
“would regularly and easily exert their will upon hapless politicians, budget meddling 
usually produced undesirable results.”130 Thus, by 1989, the defense budget had been 
decreased by 17 percent, and by 1990, had fallen another 23 percent.131   
Drastic cuts in the budget and meddling in other military affairs had, in the past, 
had drastic repercussions for Argentina’s attempts at democratic governments. But some 
now argued that, while those actions by the military and civilian government looked 
strange and somewhat disturbing, there was no real threat to the newly formed 
democratic government. Because the military’s management and its officers remained 
and operated within a carefully designated “Chain of Command.”132 This command 
chain had institutional strengths and arrangements, not previously seen in other 
institutions in Argentina, which limited the management and officers’ ability to interfere 
or protest.133 The partial success of these reforms became obvious with the partial failure 
of four military coups attempts (comprised mostly of junior officers) 1987 - 1989, a 
military backlash to the reformation measures.  Alfonsín’s capitulation to the demands 
Semana Santa rebellion had no effect on military budget issues.134 
2. The Failures 
In regard to reform of the military, there have been times when funding was 
increased, but only for certain missions that were considered important in the eyes of the 
president. International peacekeeping missions were among the few exceptions. The 
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defense minister was granted funding increases by the president, but normally, the 
economic minister made the final funding decisions by “holding the line on 
expenditures.”135 
In other nations, such as the United States, there exist numerous institutionalized 
oversight organizations, review boards, and personnel that have considerable power and 
authority to check the president’s and his administration’s budgetary proposals. In 
Argentina, the Congress is designated under the Constitution to control the financial 
management of the nation. It can “levy taxes, borrow money on the nation’s credit, 
arrange for the payment of debt, and set the annual expenditures for the nation.”136 But 
even with the support and bureaucratic legitimacy of the Constitution, the Congress 
rarely interferes with the proposed budget. 
In regard to its budgetary control, there are two main issues that affect the ability 
of the Argentine Congress: the lack of revenue data afforded to them; and the institutional 
capacity to coherently manage the revenue. The ministry of the economy holds all the 
national tax revenue information, and there exists no equivalent data-gathering sector in 
the Congress. Even if Congress wished to increase budget spending, it could do so only 
haphazardly, thereby placing the economy at risk by its straying into unknown territory.  
As to the second issue, Argentina has only one budgetary review board, the 
Committee on Budgeting and Finance. This board, which is more of a formality than an 
actual review body, debates the proposed budget, but serves primarily as a “watchdog 
function.”137 The ministers are requested to testify, but not to explain or justify 
expenditures; rather they are to interpret budgetary needs.  Pion-Berlin defines such 
ineffective institutional power as a rubber-stamp policy, at best. “In the end, however, the 
committee will usually sign off on the president’s bill.”138 
Even when the combined arms of the military were firmly under the control of a 
civilian defense minister, true control of its annual planning of operations, training, 
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routine maintenance, and other aspects of war and defense were indirectly under the 
command of the ministry of the economy (MOE). In this complex arena, the armed forces 
were then further subjugated to the MOE by not having any formal or informal 
instructional processes that could lobby for their expected budgetary needs. The 
Department of Programming and Budgetary Control was charged with formulating the 
next fiscal year’s budget, based on posted and expected tax revenues. There was limited 
transparency for each department within the ministries (civilian and military alike) by 
means of review and debate over allocations. As Pion-Berlin points out, “Little in the 
way of bargaining can take place here, since any appeal for greater allotments by one 
minister will quickly be matched and anted up by all others.”139 It was basically a 
bureaucratic formality for each governmental ministry that was then given a revenue 
allocation limit. These allocations rarely came in lump sums, but in infrequent 
installments, which made operational planning and resource dispersement tenuous at 
best.140 In addition, the arrangement did not encourage the armed forces to be frugal and 
plan for the “rainy day.” Defense funds that were not spent were rolled into a general 
fund out of the hands of the armed forces, which in turn incited the military to continue 
with unrealistic or sustainable projects for fear of losing the money.141  
3. Crisis and Political Insulation 
The crises of the military are evident and lead to the evaporation of the political 
insulation the military once enjoyed.  The crisis of the human rights violations from the 
Dirty War, the failed military action of the Falkland/Malvinas, and economic collapse 
and mismanagement from state and military operated enterprises spawned a panic and 
low faith of the military regimes that reverberated through the populace into the political 
classes and even with the military establishment itself.  By 1983, all of the military’s 
political insulation was gone throughout Argentina.  Gone are the days when military 
regimes provided a suitable and viable alternative to the Argentine populace for weak 
civilian elected political administrations.  The Proceso actions finally proved how rigid, 
unforgiving, irresponsible, and most importantly how hard it is to remove military 
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regimes.  This was an important lesson for the civilians who lived through the Dirty War, 
Falkland/Malvinas war, and numerous economic calamities.  In addition, the political 
parties have seen the low levels of public support for the military and military coups, 
which has translated into the political parties no longer needing or desiring military 
backing. The new civilian politicians have now taken advantage of these crises in 
conjuncture with the military’s low level of national respect to implement wide reaching 
civil military reform without fear of political reprisal from the military.  In addition, 
crises, such as the numerous economic collapses and the ongoing struggle for war crimes 
tribunals for human rights violations, continued throughout the 1980s through the 2001 
that kept the military in check and further distanced the political institutions from the 
military.   
D. THE GENDARMERIE 
1. The Successes 
The success of Gendarmerie reform might be described as “obedience to the rule 
of law”: it engendered not only respect for and confidence in the institution in the public 
sector, but also a perception for the GNA itself of how it must act as a security service. 
To Gendarmerie members it made clear that being “loyal” to the institution was not as 
important as being “legal” in their actions. In other words, to be successful, the 
Gendarmerie operations must be guided by the Constitution and by regional and cultural 
laws, not by any political party or establishment loyalties.  
Thus, the GNA, which traditionally is stationed throughout the frontier, became a 
symbol of the state’s interaction with the people. Gendarmerie soldiers share the lives, 
culture, and traditions of the populace. And the people now refer to them as “del pueblo,” 
from the people.142  
The Gendarmerie is most proud of its reputation for following the rule of law and 
maintaining social and public order by a proportional use of force. This shows its 
awareness of appropriate and reasonable uses of power, especially regarding the large 
portion of its operational mission that consists of “counter-disturbance.” This type of 
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operation requires the GNA to control, remove, and disperse rioters and protestors in or 
from areas such as bridges and highways that they are occupying illegally.143  
By appearing at the scene in full battle dress, complete with helmets, batons, and 
loudspeakers, thereby presenting a convincing show of force, the Gendarmerie can 
usually reestablish order without violence. The use of dissuasion tactics and force are 
considered a last resort by the GNA, as determined and expressly ordered by supervisory 
officers.144 In 1989, for example, the Uníon Tranviarios Automotor (UTA) in Buenos 
Aires province went on strike, creating chaos and pandemonium. Police efforts to control 
the situation proved inept, but within forty-eight hours of the GNA being mobilized, 
order was restored. There are numerous other instances in which the GNA has been 
called on to restore public order by dealing primarily with angry mobs or protestors. 
Interestingly, in all such cases, there has been a minimal amount of civilian injuries or 
complaints of GNA abuses.145 
2. Failures 
With a continuing trend to opt out of police oversight and with the military in 
check, the GNA is now used more and more as the primary “do-it-all”, all-purpose 
domestic security service. One of the major failures of its reform has been the lack of 
accountability and transparency in the frontier areas.  
There are rumors and reports of serious human-rights violations, including the use 
of excessive force, torture, and murders committed by the GNA.146 The Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales, or CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies), for example, 
places the blame for two wrongful deaths during a bridge protest on December 17, 1999, 
on the Gendarmerie. Other human rights groups have accused the GNA of acting with 
“unnecessary” or “deadly” force by a use of military ammunition. Unfortunately, access 
to military ammunition is readily available and accurate forensic equipment, techniques, 
and data are hard to come by in these remote areas. This causes some scholars to believe 
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that there are often cover-ups to save face after events take place. Efforts have been made 
to clarify such events, but finding the “smoking gun” is near to impossible. The only 
other alternative is using press accounts, which is pragmatic because, as Eric Carlson 
points out, “trying to find a neutral observer in the media [is] a challenging task.”147 
3. Crisis and Political Insulation 
Whereas the police and military have suffered varying degrees of crisis and 
political insulation, in comparison, the GNA has experienced very little to no crisis or 
political insulation.   Reforms to the GNA have primarily been the result or reaction of 
other organizations’ crisis and political insulation, such as taking over riot control from 
the police and anti-terrorist/counterinsurgency operations from the military. An important 
fact to note is that the missions discussed above appear to be the only missions ever done 
by the military that were deemed important by the politicians. And by reallocating the 
missions to the GNA and away from military, the military establishment has lost even 
more political insulation.  At the same time, the GNA was possibly gaining political 
insulation. This traditional outsider has been historically overlooked, primarily because of 
where it has operated, but also because of its lack of participation in key events.  
However, the GNA now seems to be viewed as a new trusted agent within the Argentine 
security sector; one that has the ability to take on these new hybrid police/military roles 
that other institutions have failed at.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The successes and failures of the reforms of the police, military, and GNA are still 
an ongoing process with some institutional reforms more compete than others.  But it is 
clear that specific institutions have been singled out and have undergone more radical, 
comprehensive, and long-lasting reforms.  And it is important to see how the effects of 
crisis and political insulation have determined what type of reforms each individual 
security force undergoes and how they experience it.  Crisis does play a key role as a 
motivating factor or at least an excuse for the populace and the political intuitions within 
Argentina.    The important question is how the politicians react when a crisis arises.  If 
they deem that no reaction or reform to the crisis will jeopardize their power, the political 
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insulation will dissipate that security service and reforms will be implemented and the 
security service will be weakened.  On the other hand, if reform to the crisis of the 
security service will degrade their overall power and prerogatives, the political insulation 
will rally and prevent overarching and complete reform of the service.  There can also be 
a third option, that once a crisis has appeared and the political insulation is unsure or 
fearful of action, they may attempt to shift responsibilities from themselves to an outsider 













The new democratic government of Argentina in 1983 faced a potentially grim 
future because of the Proceso legacy in the security sector. To flourish and function 
effectively, the transitional democracy would have to implement institutional reforms, 
especially of the out-of-control police and military. Thus, in order to maintain the rule of 
law throughout the land, its primary job was to immediately establish control of the 
security services. To accomplish this, the government instigated a reform process for all 
three branches – police, military, and the Gendarmerie. Some reforms were more 
complete and proved more successful than others which were dependent of each 




The reform of the police, which occurred later than the military reform, was less 
effective than might have been expected in the wake of the post-Proceso crisis. In the 
literature, the police participation in the Proceso has often been obscured or overlooked, 
and the police did not attract the same level of attention from politicians as the armed 
forces. During the 1990s, the attempt to reform the police failed. Only the presence of a 
major crisis, particular and specific to the police, creating a creditable threat to the 
populace, could inspire politicians to conduct reforms. In fact, the political legacies and 
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prerogatives inherited from the Perónist era were not removed during Argentina’s 
transition, and this meant that large segments of the Argentine political class continued to 
benefit from a cozy relationship with the police. The push for reform from the general 
populace were neither strong nor threatening enough to persuade the political elite to 
reform and professionalize the police force. As a result, the police remained politically 
insulated against disciplinary measures. 
C. MILITARY 
The military was the first security service during Argentina’s transition to be 
reformed, because it was perceived as the greatest threat to democratic institutions. The 
fracture and humiliation of the Proceso junta immediately after the Falklands/Malvinas 
War debacle in 1982 was the tipping point that made it possible for the transitional 
democracy to implement new and far-reaching defense reforms. However, it was not the 
Falklands/Malvinas crisis, a singular event, which caused the military establishment’s fall 
from power in Argentina. That resulted from a culmination of calamities including the 
human rights violations and citizen disappearances during the Dirty War; and fiscal 
mismanagement and the ultimate economic collapse that greatly compounded the effects 
of the misgoverning on both the general populace and the politicians. An ultra-powerful 
and corrupt military could no longer be tolerated or respected within the newly 
democratic Argentine state. Their position as a historically high and politically insulated 
entity vanished. Immediately, the politicians, aware that they could no longer benefit nor 
be replaced by the military, implemented the most wide-reaching and radical reform laws 
so far of all the security services examined. These reforms proceeded unevenly during the 
democratic period, halted occasionally by resistance from within the armed forces and by 
recurring economic crises that affected the government’s ability to reorganize the 
military. In addition, the military and politicians reached a modus vivendi during the 
Menem administration that reduced pressure for reform.       
D. GENDARMERIE 
 The Gendarmerie had long been considered the “outsider” branch of Argentina’s 
security service sector, primarily because of its role and mission in the frontier areas.  It, 
too, experienced reform by the transitional government. This was partly due, however, to 
the military’s lack of political insulation during crisis. Early on, the democratic 
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government had subjected the GNA’s chain of command to civilian control, removing it 
from the Ministry of Defense and placing it under the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Gendarmerie is now the force solely responsible for internal security, once under the 
domain of the military. These security tasks are diverse and include antiterrorist 
operations, large-scale riot control, and oversight of valuable state infrastructure. While it 
may be too early to say definitively whether the GNA can successfully and transparently 
perform these new roles over time, its minimal involvement during crisis situations and a 
general perception of its low level of political insulation give it a comparative advantage. 
This means that there is a real chance that the corrective reforms can and will improve the 
GNA’s performance and its role in Argentina’s security sector, even if potentially 
negative events occur.  
E. LESSONS 
Nations in transition, like Argentina, must carefully consider the best methods for 
successfully reforming their security services so as to place the monopoly on violence 
and the rule of law within the governmental domain and, ultimately, in the hands of 
democratically elected civilian policy-makers. In designing successful reforms, they must 
also consider the nature and effect of political insulation on the security services. If their 
political insulation enjoyed by a security force is considerable, as it was in the case of the 
Argentine police, it provides cover from the top down, protecting the service from 
successful reform action. But if the political insulation is marginal or nonexistent, as was 
the case with the Argentine military and the Gendarmerie, the political establishment has 
a greater opportunity to conduct successful reform. A transitional government must also 
understand and be able to identify the nature of crises, because a crisis or failure in a 
security service’s performance often provides an opportunity, if appropriately exploited 
by the government, to implement reform. To achieve this, however, reform-minded 
politicians must be allowed the freedom and the fiscal resources, during times of crisis, to 
develop and implement reform policies. If this does not occur, as we have seen with 
Argentina, the economic inadequacy of the transitional state may well limit its ability and 
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